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Respondent details

  • Company/Organisation: Plateforme PTCI/TTIP
  • Location: Luxembourg
  • Activity: Domaine syndical; Milieu environnemental et agricole; Protection des consommateurs; Milieu social/ Coopération Pays Tiers Monde.
  • Profile: Plateforme regroupant 13 organisations syndicales et Organisations non gouvernementales: Action Solidarité Tiers Monde, Aleba, Bio-Lëtzebuerg Asbl, Caritas Luxembourg, Cercle des ONG de développement Luxembourg, FNCTFFEL, Greenpeace Luxembourg, LCGB, Lëtzebuerger Jongbaueren a Jongwënzer Asbl, Mouvement écologique Asbl, OGBL, Union luxembourgeoise des consommateurs Asbl, Syprolux
  • Transparency register: No
  • Prior investment in the US: No

Contribution

A. Substantive investment protection provisions

Explanation of the issue

The scope of the agreement responds to a key question: What type of investments and investors should be protected? Our response is that investment protection should apply to those investments and to investors that have made an investment in accordance with the laws of the country where they have invested.

Approach in most investment agreements

Many international investment agreements have broad provisions defining “investor” and “investment”.

In most cases, the definition of “investment” is intentionally broad, as investment is generally a complex operation that may involve a wide range of assets, such as land, buildings, machinery, equipment, intellectual property rights, contracts, licences, shares, bonds, and various financial instruments. At the same time, most bilateral investment agreements refer to “investments made in accordance with applicable law”. This reference has worked well and has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse to grant investment protection to investors who have not respected the law of the host state when making the investment (for example, by structuring the investment in such a way as to circumvent clear prohibitions in the law of the host state, or by procuring an investment fraudulently or through bribery).

In many investment agreements, the definition of “investor” simply refers to natural and juridical persons of the other Party to the agreement, without further refinement. This has allowed in some cases so–called “shell” or “mailbox” companies, owned or controlled by nationals or companies not intended to be protected by the agreement and having no real business activities in the country concerned, to make use of an investment agreement to launch claims before an ISDS tribunal.

The EU's objectives and approach

The EU wants to avoid abuse. This is achieved primarily by improving the definition of “investor”, thus eliminating so –called “shell” or “mailbox” companies owned by nationals of third countries from the scope: in order to qualify as a legitimate investor of a Party, a juridical person must have substantial business activities in the territory of that Party.

At the same time, the EU wants to rely on past treaty practice with a proven track record. The reference to “investments made in accordance with the applicable law” is one such example. Another is the clarification that protection is only granted in situations where investors have already committed substantial resources in the host state - and not when they are simply at the stage where they are planning to do so.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of the substantive investment protection provisions in TTIP?

La notion d’investissement : La définition du concept d’investissement donnée à titre d’exemple dans le document en annexe, et plus particulièrement la définition retenue dans le cadre des négociations avec le Canada, reprend, ou en tout cas recouvre celle élaborée dans le cadre des négociations sur l’Accord multilatéral sur l’investissement (OCDE). Cette approche qui consiste à énumérer tous les types d’actifs constituant des investissements au sens de l’accord a été, à l’époque des négociations de l’AMI, très critiquée. Cette définition est extrêmement large, ce qui a presque pour effet de faire coïncider la notion d’investissement avec celle de bien. Alors que la première devrait nécessairement être plus restreinte que la seconde. Les textes de référence proposés ne semblent par ailleurs opérer aucune distinction en fonction de « l’importance » de l’investissement, alors même que le paragraphe précédent la question (les objectifs et approches de l’Union) propose comme exemple à suivre de n’accorder la protection qu’aux investisseurs ayant déjà « engagé des ressources substantielles dans l’État d’accueil ». Il est très étonnant de ne pas retrouver dans la proposition de définition de la notion d’investissement une référence à la distinction entre investissement direct et investissement de portefeuille, la seconde catégorie devant selon nous être exclue du champ d’application de l’accord, même s’il est vrai que les concepts d’investissements directs et d’investissements de portefeuille ne font pas l’objet d’une définition claire et précise (ou en tout cas communément admise). En tout état de cause, les investissements couverts devraient correspondre aux investissements réalisés dans l’optique d’acquérir un intérêt durable dans une entreprise de l’autre partie, et donner à l’investisseur une influence significative sur la gestion de l’entreprise. Cela permettrait d’exclure du champ d’application les investissements de portefeuille ainsi que les opérations réalisées sur les marchés financiers. Il serait envisageable pour cela de s’inspirer de la définition d’investissement direct telle qu’envisagée par la directive 88/361/CEE, et au minimum de reprendre l’idée de liens économiques durables.La notion d’investisseur : L’approche par « définition négative » retenue plus loin dans le texte de référence (accord avec la Canada) n’est sans doute pas la plus appropriée. Il semble en effet préférable de réaliser une mise en commun des deux textes de référence. Dans l’hypothèse où l’investisseur serait une entreprise organisée ou constituée en vertu du droit national de l’une des parties, celle-ci doit appartenir ou être contrôlée par un investisseur de cette partie et avoir une activité substantielle. Cela permet de mettre suffisamment en avant le nécessaire caractère substantiel de l’activité de l’investisseur en ayant recours à une définition positive de la notion. Cela permet également d’éviter tout recours abusif à la création de filiale qui aurait uniquement pour but d’obtenir la qualification d’investissement étranger. La définition d’investisseur quant à elle inclut le futur investisseur (« that seeks to make an investment »). Ne pas distinguer (même au stade de la définition) l’investisseur du futur investisseur pourrait conduire à accorder la même protection lors de la phase précédant l’investissement et lors de la phase consécutive à celui-ci. Ceci ne semble pas être une option adéquate. Il est vrai que l’article 63 du TFUE impose d’assurer la libre circulation des capitaux, y compris ceux en provenance des pays tiers, et y compris ceux impliquant des investissements directs. Cependant, les articles suivants envisagent de nombreuses exceptions à ce principe, exceptions du ressort des États membres (restreindre dans certaines conditions la liberté d’établissement, assurer le respect de la législation fiscale, etc.) aussi bien que de celui de l’Union elle-même (en cas de difficultés graves pour le fonctionnement de l'Union économique et monétaire, ou d’adoption de mesures constituant un recul par rapport au droit de l’Union existant en matière de libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux, etc.). Il est légitime de penser que le maintien de la définition de la notion d’investisseur en l’état risquerait de remettre en cause l’application des exceptions à la libre circulation des capitaux en provenance des pays tiers telles qu’envisagées par les traités.

Explanation of the issue

Under the standards of non-discriminatory treatment of investors, a state Party to the agreement commits itself to treat foreign investors from the other Party in the same way in which it treats its own investors (national treatment), as well in the same way in which it treats investors from other countries (most-favoured nation treatment). This ensures a level playing field between foreign investors and local investors or investors from other countries. For instance, if a certain chemical substance were to be proven to be toxic to health, and the state took a decision that it should be prohibited, the state should not impose this prohibition only on foreign companies, while allowing domestic ones to continue to produce and sell that substance.

Non-discrimination obligations may apply after the foreign investor has made the investment in accordance with the applicable law (post-establishment), but they may also apply to the conditions of access of that investor to the market of the host country (pre-establishment).  

Approach in most existing investment agreements

The standards of national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment are considered to be key provisions of investment agreements and therefore they have been consistently included in such agreements, although with some variation in substance.

Regarding national treatment, many investment agreements do not allow states to discriminate between a domestic and a foreign investor once the latter is already established in a Party’s territory. Other agreements, however, allow such discrimination to take place in a limited number of sectors.

Regarding MFN, most investment agreements do not clarify whether foreign investors are entitled to take advantage of procedural or substantive provisions contained in other past or future agreements concluded by the host country. Thus, investors may be able to claim that they are entitled to benefit from any provision of another agreement that they consider to be more favourable, which may even permit the application of an entirely new standard of protection that was not found in the original agreement. In practice, this is commonly referred to as "importation of standards".

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU considers that, as a matter of principle, established investors should not be discriminated against after they have established in the territory of the host country, while at the same recognises that in certain rare cases and in some very specific sectors, discrimination against already established investors may need to be envisaged. The situation is different with regard to the right of establishment, where the Parties may choose whether or not to open certain markets or sectors, as they see fit.

On the "importation of standards" issue, the EU seeks to clarify that MFN does not allow procedural or substantive provisions to be imported from other agreements.

The EU also includes exceptions allowing the Parties to take measures relating to the protection of health, the environment, consumers, etc. Additional carve-outs would apply to the audio-visual sector and the granting of subsidies. These are typically included in EU FTAs and also apply to the non-discrimination obligations relating to investment. Such exceptions allow differences in treatment between investors and investments where necessary to achieve public policy objectives.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanations and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the EU approach to non –discrimination in relation to the TTIP? Please explain.

À ce propos, il convient de constater, sans aller jusqu’à mettre en place un droit d’établissement, c’est toute la phase préinvestissement qui semble être incluse du champ d’application de la protection. Or celle-ci ne devrait s’appliquer qu’à la phase postérieure à l’investissement. En effet, comme cela a été souligné dans la question précédente sous un autre angle, il est exact que les États membres ne peuvent restreindre les mouvements de capitaux en provenance de pays tiers, y compris lorsque ceux-ci constituent des investissements directs. Cependant, prévoir, dans un accord international de grande ampleur, que la protection lors de la phase précédant l’investissement et lors de la phase postérieure à l’investissement est identique risque de remettre en cause les possibilités offertes aux États membres ainsi qu’à l’Union de contrôler l’admission des investissements étrangers directs sur son territoire en vertu des articles 63 et suivants du TFUE. Il semble que l’Union (et dans une moindre mesure les États membres du fait des règles déjà contenues dans les traités) devrait réaffirmer la possibilité de contrôler l’admission des investissements étrangers sur son territoire en tant que principe pour préserver sa compétence dans ce domaine. Le texte de l’accord avec le Canada sur ce point précise que les investissements et les investisseurs entrant dans le champ d’application sont traités comme les investissements nationaux et les investissements en provenance d’États non-parties le seraient dans des circonstances similaires (« like situations »). Ceci soulève des questions quant la portée d’une telle expression. Concerne-t-elle par exemple le moment de l’investissement ou les caractéristiques de l’entreprise ou les deux ? On peut également se demander pourquoi la règle générale fait référence à un traitement non moins favorable que celui accordé aux autres investissements ou investisseurs (NPF ou TN), alors que la règle concernant les autorités décentralisées fait référence à un traitement non moins favorable que le traitement le plus favorable accordé par l’autorité en question. Notons également que le texte n’opère aucune distinction entre une discrimination de jure et une discrimination de facto. En toute rigueur, cela signifie qu’une loi générale ayant un effet discriminatoire dans les faits pourra être considérée comme contraire aux principes NPF et TN. À notre avis, seules les mesures dirigées directement contre l’investisseur devraient être considérées. Au sujet des exceptions, le texte énonce de façon limitative les exceptions à ces deux principes. Pour cela, le texte proposé ne fait que reprendre les exceptions générales déjà prévues par les accords du GATT. Cette approche semble d’emblée beaucoup trop restrictive en ce qu’elle ferme définitivement la porte à toute exception particulière que les États membres pourraient envisager en fonction de leur contexte national propre, ou en raison de restrictions existantes au niveau national et conformes aux traités. De plus, ces exceptions ne concernent que le chapitre sur la non-discrimination et non toutes les dispositions relatives à la protection des investissements. Enfin, la liste des exceptions en elle-même reste très limitée (ordre public, sécurité public, santé et sécurité, protection de l’environnement). La protection des travailleurs devrait également faire partie de la liste.

Explanation of the issue

The obligation to grant foreign investors fair and equitable treatment (FET) is one of the key investment protection standards. It ensures that investors and investments are protected against treatment by the host country which, even if not expropriatory or discriminatory, is still unacceptable because it is arbitrary, unfair, abusive, etc. 

Approach in most investment agreements

The FET standard is present in most international investment agreements. However, in many cases the standard is not defined, and it is usually not limited or clarified. Inevitably, this has given arbitral tribunals significant room for interpretation, and the interpretations adopted by arbitral tribunals have varied from very narrow to very broad, leading to much controversy about the precise meaning of the standard. This lack of clarity has fueled a large number of ISDS claims by investors, some of which have raised concern with regard to the states' right to regulate. In particular, in some cases, the standard has been understood to encompass the protection of the legitimate expectations of investors in a very broad way, including the expectation of a stable general legislative framework.

Certain investment agreements have narrowed down the content of the FET standard by linking it to concepts that are considered to be part of customary international law, such as the minimum standard of treatment that countries must respect in relation to the treatment accorded to foreigners. However, this has also resulted in a wide range of differing arbitral tribunal decisions on what is or is not covered by customary international law, and has not brought the desired greater clarity to the definition of the standard. An issue sometimes linked to the FET standard is the respect by the host country of its legal obligations towards the foreign investors and their investments (sometimes referred to as an "umbrella clause"), e.g. when the host country has entered into a contract with the foreign investor. Investment agreements may have specific provisions to this effect, which have sometimes been interpreted broadly as implying that every breach of e.g. a contractual obligation could constitute a breach of the investment agreement.

EU objectives and approach

The main objective of the EU is to clarify the standard, in particular by incorporating key lessons learned from case-law. This would eliminate uncertainty for both states and investors.

Under this approach, a state could be held responsible for a breach of the fair and equitable treatment obligation only for breaches of a limited set of basic rights, namely: the denial of justice; the disregard of the fundamental principles of due process; manifest arbitrariness; targeted discrimination based on gender, race or religious belief; and abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress or harassment. This list may be extended only where the Parties (the EU and the US) specifically agree to add such elements to the content of the standard, for instance where there is evidence that new elements of the standard have emerged from international law.

The “legitimate expectations” of the investor may be taken into account in the interpretation of the standard. However, this is possible only where clear, specific representations have been made by a Party to the agreement in order to convince the investor to make or maintain the investment and upon which the investor relied, and that were subsequently not respected by that Party. The intention is to make it clear that an investor cannot legitimately expect that the general regulatory and legal regime will not change. Thus the EU intends to ensure that the standard is not understood to be a “stabilisation obligation”, in other words a guarantee that the legislation of the host state will not change in a way that might negatively affect investors. In line with the general objective of clarifying the content of the standard, the EU shall also strive, where necessary, to provide protection to foreign investors in situations in which the host state uses its sovereign powers to avoid contractual obligations towards foreign investors or their investments, without however covering ordinary contractual breaches like the non-payment of an invoice.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors and their investments in relation to the TTIP?

Il convient de souligner que le recours à la notion d’attentes légitimes doit à tout prix être encadré de façon stricte. Cette notion a en effet fait l’objet d’une interprétation assez large par le passé, interprétation qui a pu mettre en danger le pouvoir règlementaire des États. Il apparait à ce titre primordial de préciser qu’une telle clause ne doit en aucun cas permettre à l’investisseur de s’affranchir artificiellement du risque commercial inhérent à tout investissement. Les attentes de celui-ci doivent par ailleurs être légitimes et surtout raisonnables. Ces attentes doivent reposer sur une déclaration de l’une des parties officielle, claire, non-équivoque et conforme au droit national applicable, et qui constitue un élément déterminant dans la décision de l’investisseur de maintenir ou de réaliser un investissement. En tout état de cause, l’obligation de TJE ne donne pas droit à l’investisseur à l’immutabilité de l’ordre juridique local.

Explanation of the issue

The right to property is a human right, enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as in the legal tradition of EU Member States. This right is crucial to investors and investments. Indeed, the greatest risk that investors may incur in a foreign country is the risk of having their investment expropriated without compensation. This is why the guarantees against expropriation are placed at the core of any international investment agreement.

Direct expropriations, which entail the outright seizure of a property right, do not occur often nowadays and usually do not generate controversy in arbitral practice. However, arbitral tribunals are confronted with a much more difficult task when it comes to assessing whether a regulatory measure of a state, which does not entail the direct transfer of the property right, might be considered equivalent to expropriation (indirect expropriation).

Approach in most investment agreements

In investment agreements, expropriations are permitted if they are for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, resulting from the due process of law and are accompanied by prompt and effective compensation. This applies to both direct expropriation (such as nationalisation) and indirect expropriation (a measure having an effect equivalent to expropriation).

Indirect expropriation has been a source of concern in certain cases where regulatory measures taken for legitimate purposes have been subject to investor claims for compensation, on the grounds that such measures were equivalent to expropriation because of their significant negative impact on investment. Most investment agreements do not provide details or guidance in this respect, which has inevitably left arbitral tribunals with significant room for interpretation.

The EU's objectives and approach

The objective of the EU is to clarify the provisions on expropriation and to provide interpretative guidance with regard to indirect expropriation in order to avoid claims against legitimate public policy measures.  The EU wants to make it clear that non-discriminatory measures taken for legitimate public purposes, such as to protect health or the environment, cannot be considered equivalent to an expropriation, unless they are manifestly excessive in light of their purpose. The EU also wants to clarify that the simple fact that a measure has an impact on the economic value of the investment does not justify a claim that an indirect expropriation has occurred.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the approach to dealing with expropriation in relation to the TTIP? Please explain.

Pour commencer, il convient de préciser qu’une véritable expropriation directe ou même indirecte apparait très peu probable dans ces deux zones du globe. Constatons d’ailleurs à ce titre que les traités bilatéraux d’investissements conclus le sont très majoritairement entre des pays développés et des pays en voie de développement. Les inquiétudes qui ont présidé à la signature de ces accords ne semblent plus être justifiées dans le contexte des négociations avec les États-Unis. S’il est vrai que l’article 345 du TFUE tel qu’interprété par la Cour prévoit que les traités ne s’opposent pas ni à la nationalisation ni à la privatisation des entreprises. Cependant, la Cour fait une interprétation très stricte de cet article. Concernant plus particulièrement le texte résultant des négociations avec le Canada, le premier paragraphe contient 4 critères. Ceux-ci sont, de toute évidence, cumulatifs mais cela ne ressort pas clairement de la formulation de cet article. Concernant le premier paragraphe de l’annexe du même texte, il apparait préférable de supprimer l’adverbe « substantiellement ». En effet, expropriation suppose d’être privé totalement des attributs du droit de propriété. Conserver l’adverbe substantiellement serait en contradiction flagrante avec la notion même d’expropriation. Enfin, concernant le paragraphe 3 de l’annexe du même texte, l’exception au principe selon lequel les mesures adoptées dans l’intérêt public ne constituent pas des mesures d’expropriation doit être interprétée très strictement (et en particulier l’expression « manifestement excessive »). Par ailleurs, il convient d’ajouter à la liste des mesures constituant des mesures adoptées dans l’intérêt public les droits individuels et collectifs des travailleurs, la protection du bien commun et de l’environnement en général, la sauvegarde du service public et des régimes de protection sociale, la règlementation des marchés financiers, les dispositions en matière de politique industrielle et fiscale et la protection des droits fondamentaux.

Explanation of the issue

In democratic societies, the right to regulate of states is subject to principles and rules contained in both domestic legislation and in international law. For instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Contracting States commit themselves to guarantee a number of civil and political rights. In the EU, the Constitutions of the Member States, as well as EU law, ensure that the actions of the state cannot go against fundamental rights of the citizens. Hence, public regulation must be based on a legitimate purpose and be necessary in a democratic society.

Investment agreements reflect this perspective. Nevertheless, wherever such agreements contain provisions that appear to be very broad or ambiguous, there is always a risk that the arbitral tribunals interpret them in a manner which may be perceived as a threat to the state's right to regulate. In the end, the decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good as the provisions that they have to interpret and apply.

 Approach in most investment agreements

Most agreements that are focused on investment protection are silent about how public policy issues, such as public health, environmental protection, consumer protection or prudential regulation, might interact with investment. Consequently, the relationship between the protection of investments and the right to regulate in such areas, as envisaged by the contracting Parties to such agreements is not clear and this creates uncertainty.

In more recent agreements, however, this concern is increasingly addressed through, on the one hand, clarification of the key investment protection provisions that have proved to be controversial in the past and, on the other hand, carefully drafted exceptions to certain commitments. In complex agreements such as free trade agreements with provisions on investment, or regional integration agreements, the inclusion of such safeguards is the usual practice.

The EU's objectives and approach

The objective of the EU is to achieve a solid balance between the protection of investors and the Parties' right to regulate.

First of all, the EU wants to make sure that the Parties' right to regulate is confirmed as a basic underlying principle. This is important, as arbitral tribunals will have to take this principle into account when assessing any dispute settlement case.

Secondly, the EU will introduce clear and innovative provisions with regard to investment protection standards that have raised concern in the past (for instance, the standard of fair and equitable treatment is defined based on a closed list of basic rights; the annex on expropriation clarifies that non-discriminatory measures for legitimate public policy objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation). These improvements will ensure that investment protection standards cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a way that is detrimental to the right to regulate.

Third, the EU will ensure that all the necessary safeguards and exceptions are in place. For instance, foreign investors should be able to establish in the EU only under the terms and conditions defined by the EU. A list of horizontal exceptions will apply to non-discrimination obligations, in relation to measures such as those taken in the field of environmental protection, consumer protection or health (see question 2 for details). Additional carve-outs would apply to the audiovisual sector and the granting of subsidies. Decisions on competition matters will not be subject to investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Furthermore, in line with other EU agreements, nothing in the agreement would prevent a Party from taking measures for prudential reasons, including measures for the protection of depositors or measures to ensure the integrity and stability of its financial system. In addition, EU agreements contain general exceptions applying in situations of crisis, such as in circumstances of serious difficulties for the operation of the exchange rate policy or monetary policy, balance of payments or external financial difficulties, or threat thereof.

In terms of the procedural aspects relating to ISDS, the objective of the EU is to build a system capable of adapting to the states' right to regulate. Wherever greater clarity and precision proves necessary in order to protect the right to regulate, the Parties will have the possibility to adopt interpretations of the investment protection provisions which will be binding on arbitral tribunals.  This will allow the Parties to oversee how the agreement is interpreted in practice and, where necessary, to influence the interpretation.

The procedural improvements proposed by the EU will also make it clear that an arbitral tribunal will not be able to order the repeal of a measure, but only compensation for the investor.

Furthermore, frivolous claims will be prevented and investors who bring claims unsuccessfully will pay the costs of the government concerned (see question 9).

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion with regard to the way the right to regulate is dealt with in the EU's approach to TTIP?

Dans sa résolution du 22 mars 2011 sur la future politique européenne en matière d’investissements internationaux, le Parlement européen avait souligné que « plutôt que de se concentrer essentiellement sur la protection de l’investissement, [la Commission] devrait mieux évoquer la droit de protéger la capacité de règlementation publique ». Rappeler que le pouvoir règlementaire constitue un principe fondamental sous-jacent ne constitue en aucun cas une solution satisfaisante. Au contraire, cette formulation est utilisée non pour rappeler un principe général (ce qui est pourtant le cas en théorie) mais pour particulariser certains domaines (en général social et environnemental) et exclure par la même les autres domaines. Il est vrai qu’il s’agit là des domaines qui suscitent le plus de crainte, mais une telle formulation en plus d’être inutile pourrait s’avérer dangereuse. L’État n’aurait-il à l’avenir que le droit de règlementer dans ces domaines à l’exclusion de tous les autres ? De plus, ces clauses font la plupart du temps référence à la notion de nécessité ou au caractère approprié des mesures adoptées dans le cadre de l’exercice du pouvoir règlementaire. Ceci aura pour conséquence une mise en balance des intérêts protégés par la mesure (intérêt public), la contribution de la mesure à la réalisation de l’objectif poursuivi et le degré de restriction du commerce, en d’autres termes la mise en place d’un « test de proportionnalité ». L’efficacité d’une éventuelle « clause d’exception » (voir paragraphe précédent) s’en trouvera encore réduite puisque les mesures y compris sociales et environnementales devront « passer » ce test de proportionnalité. Une telle mise en balance est sans doute biaisée dès le départ. Rappelons que la construction du marché européen s’opère autour de libertés économiques fondamentales et que le PTCI ne vise qu’une prolongation transatlantique de ce marché (« a truly transantlantic market place »). Il est donc probable que la norme sociale ou environnementale sera considérée comme une entrave à l’investissement, et que celle-ci devra donc être proportionnée, dans la mesure où un accord sur l’investissement a précisément pour objectif non seulement de protéger mais aussi d’étendre les libertés économiques de l’investisseur.

B. Investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS)

Explanation of the issue

In most ISDS cases, no or little information is made available to the public, hearings are not open and third parties are not allowed to intervene in the proceedings. This makes it difficult for the public to know the basic facts and to evaluate the claims being brought by either side.

This lack of openness has given rise to concern and confusion with regard to the causes and potential outcomes of ISDS disputes. Transparency is essential to ensure the legitimacy and accountability of the system. It enables stakeholders interested in a dispute to be informed and contribute to the proceedings. It fosters accountability in arbitrators, as their decisions are open to scrutiny. It contributes to consistency and predictability as it helps create a body of cases and information that can be relied on by investors, stakeholders, states and ISDS tribunals.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

Under the rules that apply in most existing agreements, both the responding state and the investor need to agree to permit the publication of submissions. If either the investor or the responding state does not agree to publication, documents cannot be made public. As a result, most ISDS cases take place behind closed doors and no or a limited number of documents are made available to the public.

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU's aim is to ensure transparency and openness in the ISDS system under TTIP. The EU will include provisions to guarantee that hearings are open and that all documents are available to the public. In ISDS cases brought under TTIP, all documents will be publicly available (subject only to the protection of confidential information and business secrets) and hearings will be open to the public. Interested parties from civil society will be able to file submissions to make their views and arguments known to the ISDS tribunal. 

The EU took a leading role in establishing new United Nations rules on transparency[1] in ISDS. The objective of transparency will be achieved by incorporating these rules into TTIP.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on whether this approach contributes to the objective of the EU to increase transparency and openness in the ISDS system for TTIP. Please indicate any additional suggestions you may have.

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées en matière de transparence ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. L’article 6(3) du règlement de la Commission des Nations unies pour le droit commercial international (CNUDCI) dispose que le tribunal peut « décider de tenir tout ou partie des audiences à huis clos si une telle mesure devient nécessaire pour des motifs logistiques, notamment si les circonstances rendent impossible toute disposition prévue aux fins de l’accès du public à une audience ». Le terme d’impossibilité n’est cependant pas assez clair. Il semblerait que l’accès public à une audience puisse être remis en cause par de simples considérations logistiques.

Explanation of the issue

Investors who consider that they have grounds to complain about action taken by the authorities (e.g. discrimination or lack of compensation after expropriation) often have different options. They may be able to go to domestic courts and seek redress there. They or any related companies may be able to go to other international tribunals under other international investment treaties.

It is often the case that protection offered in investment agreements cannot be invoked before domestic courts and the applicable legal rules are different. For example, discrimination in favour of local companies is not prohibited under US law but is prohibited in investment agreements. There are also concerns that, in some cases domestic courts may favour the local government over the foreign investor e.g. when assessing a claim for compensation for expropriation or may deny due process rights such as the effective possibility to appeal. Governments may have immunity from being sued. In addition, the remedies are often different. In some cases government measures can be reversed by domestic courts, for example if they are illegal or unconstitutional. ISDS tribunals cannot order governments to reverse measures.

These different possibilities raise important and complex issues. It is important to make sure that a government does not pay more than the correct compensation. It is also important to ensure consistency between rulings.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

Existing investment agreements generally do not regulate or address the relationship with domestic courts or other ISDS tribunals. Some agreements require that the investor choses between domestic courts and ISDS tribunals. This is often referred to as "fork in the road" clause.

The EU’s objectives and approach

As a matter of principle, the EU’s approach favours domestic courts. The EU aims to provide incentives for investors to pursue claims in domestic courts or to seek amicable solutions – such as mediation. The EU will suggest different instruments to do this. One is to prolong the relevant time limits if an investor goes to domestic courts or mediation on the same matter, so as not to discourage an investor from pursuing these avenues.  Another important element is to make sure that investors cannot bring claims on the same matter at the same time in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic courts. The EU will also ensure that companies affiliated with the investor cannot bring claims in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic courts on the same matter and at the same time. If there are other relevant or related cases, ISDS tribunals must take these into account. This is done to avoid any risk that the investor is over-compensated and helps to ensure consistency by excluding the possibility for parallel claims.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the effectiveness of this approach for balancing access to ISDS with possible recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness of mediation as a means to settle disputes.

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées en matière de recours multiples et de rapport avec les tribunaux nationaux ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. Concernant l’absence d’effet direct, il convient de souligner qu’il s’agit ici d’un faux problème. Aucune des dispositions du futur PTCI n’aura d’effet direct, il n’y a donc aucune raison de particulariser celles relatives à l’investissement. Il semble préférable d’envisager l’adoption d’une norme de droit dérivé garantissant la protection des investissements et investisseurs, plutôt que d’avoir recours à un tel mécanisme. Il faudra également prévoir un engagement similaire de la part des États-Unis. Il est également possible de s’appuyer sur la conclusion de contrats spécifiques d’investissement entre les États et les investisseurs. De plus, il n’est pas exclu qu’une mesure puisse faire l’objet de deux interprétations différentes. En effet, les dispositions en cause garantissent qu’un investisseur devra choisir entre l’arbitrage et les juridictions nationales. Mais une mesure ayant des « effets » sur l’investissement pour être examinée dans le cadre de litiges différents impliquant des investisseurs ou des investissements différents, et le cas échéant devant les juridictions nationales et un tribunal arbitral. Ceci constitue un grave problème en termes de sécurité juridique. Les dispositions en cause ne permettent pas davantage d’empêcher une société-mère d’avoir recours au mécanisme de RDIE alors que ses filiales ont saisi les tribunaux nationaux. Le texte permet à un investisseur de saisir un tribunal arbitral alors même qu’un juge national ou international a déjà rendu une décision sur l’affaire en cause. Dans nos systèmes juridiques, il est inconcevable qu’un tribunal arbitral puisse devenir l’arbitre ultime d’une décision définitive rendue par une juridiction nationale ou internationale. Notons enfin qu’aucune disposition n’a été prévue en cas de litispendance ou de connexité. Ceci est d’autant plus inquiétant que le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I ne prévoit finalement (contrairement à la proposition) aucune règle en la matière. À notre avis, la seule solution envisageable dans de telles circonstances est précisément d’exclure l’introduction d’un mécanisme de RDIE au sein du futur PTCI.

Explanation of the issue

There is concern that arbitrators on ISDS tribunals do not always act in an independent and impartial manner. Because the individuals in question may not only act as arbitrators, but also as lawyers for companies or governments, concerns have been expressed as to potential bias or conflicts of interest.

Some have also expressed concerns about the qualifications of arbitrators and that they may not have the necessary qualifications on matters of public interest or on matters that require a balancing between investment protection and e.g. environment, health or consumer protection.

Approach in existing investment agreements

  Most existing investment agreements do not address the issue of the conduct or behaviour of arbitrators. International rules on arbitration address the issue by allowing the responding government or the investor to challenge the choice of arbitrator because of concerns of suitability.

Most agreements allow the investor and the responding state to select arbitrators but do not establish rules on the qualifications or a list of approved, qualified arbitrators to draw from.

  The EU’s objective and approach

The EU aims to establish clear rules to ensure that arbitrators are independent and act ethically. The EU will introduce specific requirements in the TTIP on the ethical conduct of arbitrators, including a code of conduct. This code of conduct will be binding on arbitrators in ISDS tribunals set up under TTIP.  The code of conduct also establishes procedures to identify and deal with any conflicts of interest.  Failure to abide by these ethical rules will result in the removal of the arbitrator from the tribunal. For example, if a responding state considers that the arbitrator chosen by the investor does not have the necessary qualifications or that he has a conflict of interest, the responding state can challenge the appointment. If the arbitrator is in breach of the Code of Conduct, he/she will be removed from the tribunal. In case the ISDS tribunal has already rendered its award and a breach of the code of conduct is found, the responding state or the investor can request a reversal of that ISDS finding.

In the text provided as reference (the draft EU-Canada Agreement), the Parties (i.e. the EU and Canada) have agreed for the first time in an investment agreement to include rules on the conduct of arbitrators, and have included the possibility to improve them further if necessary. In the context of TTIP these would be directly included in the agreement.

As regards the qualifications of ISDS arbitrators, the EU aims to set down detailed requirements for the arbitrators who act in ISDS tribunals under TTIP. They must be independent and impartial, with expertise in international law and international investment law and, if possible, experience in international trade law and international dispute resolution. Among those best qualified and who have undertaken such tasks will be retired judges, who generally have experience in ruling on issues that touch upon both trade and investment and on societal and public policy issues. The EU also aims to set up a roster, i.e. a list of qualified individuals from which the Chairperson for the ISDS tribunal is drawn, if the investor or the responding state cannot otherwise agree to a Chairperson. The purpose of such a roster is to ensure that the EU and the US have agreed to and vetted the arbitrators to ensure their abilities and independence.  In this way the responding state chooses one arbitrator and has vetted the third arbitrator.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these procedures and in particular on the Code of Conduct and the requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP agreement. Do they improve the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged?

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées en matière d’éthique, de conduite et de qualifications des arbitres ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. En termes de compétences, le texte de référence exige des arbitres qu’ils aient des compétences et de l’expérience en matière de droit international public et en particulier en droit international des investissements. Or le texte de référence ne prévoit pas l’exigence pour au moins un des arbitres, de disposer de certaines compétences dans le droit national applicable. Le droit sera alors interprété en utilisant des concepts et des méthodes propres au droit international, ceux-ci étant parfois éloignés des préoccupations nationales. Le texte de référence prévoit la création d’un Comité services et investissements qui a pour mission d’adopter un code de conduite à l’attention des arbitres. Le texte ne prévoit cependant aucune ligne directrice spécifique quant à l’élaboration de ce code de conduite et de son contenu. De plus, le terme « code de conduite » laisse une marge de manœuvre, à notre avis inacceptable, quant au caractère contraignant d’un tel code. Le texte de référence fait mention des lignes directrices de l’Association internationale du barreau. Ces lignes directrices ne visent que les conflits d’intérêts individuels. Il semble pourtant que les arbitres en cette matière puissent avoir intérêt à rendre des décisions favorables aux investisseurs afin d’assurer la survie du système d’arbitrage lui-même dans la mesure où le mécanisme de RDIE ne permet qu’aux investisseurs d’être demandeurs. Il est donc indéniable que les arbitres ont un intérêt (financier ?) à l’utilisation de ce mécanisme.

Explanation of the issue

As in all legal systems, cases are brought that have little or no chance of succeeding (so-called “frivolous claims”). Despite eventually being rejected by the tribunals, such cases take up time and money for the responding state. There have been concerns that protracted and frequent litigation in ISDS could have an effect on the policy choices made by states. This is why it is important to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to weed out frivolous disputes as early as possible.

Another issue is the cost of ISDS proceedings. In many ISDS cases, even if the responding state is successful in defending its measures in front of the ISDS tribunal, it may have to pay substantial amounts to cover its own defence.

Approach in most existing investment agreements:

Under existing investment agreements, there are generally no rules dealing with frivolous claims. Some arbitration rules however do have provisions on frivolous claims. As a result, there is a risk that frivolous or clearly unfounded claims are allowed to proceed. Even though the investor would lose such claims, the long proceedings and the implied questions surrounding policy can be problematic.

The issue of who bears the cost is also not addressed in most existing investment agreements. Some international arbitration rules have provisions that address the issue of costs in very general terms. In practice, ISDS tribunals have often decided that the investor and responding state pay their own legal costs, regardless of who wins or loses.

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU will introduce several instruments in TTIP to quickly dismiss frivolous claims.

ISDS tribunals will be required to dismiss claims that are obviously without legal merit or legally unfounded. For example, this would be cases where the investor is not established in the US or the EU, or cases where the ISDS tribunal can quickly establish that there is in fact no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors. This provides an early and effective filtering mechanism for frivolous claims thereby avoiding a lengthy litigation process.

To further discourage unfounded claims, the EU is proposing that the losing party should bear all costs of the proceedings. So if investors take a chance at bringing certain claims and fail, they have to pay the full financial costs of this attempt.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these mechanisms for the avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit frivolous or unfounded claims.

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées en matière d’éthique, de réduction des risques de recours abusifs ou infondés ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. La question de la recevabilité d’une affaire est systématiquement abordée lors de procédures judiciaires ou d’arbitrage. Il convient donc de douter de l’utilité de telles dispositions. Rappelons que la protection accordée aux investisseurs ne peut remettre en cause le pouvoir réglementaire d’un Etat partie. Le recours au mécanisme de RDIE devrait être par principe rejeté, et ce d’autant plus dans les cas où des mesures adoptées dans l’intérêt public sont mises en cause, tout recours de ce type étant par nature infondé.

Explanation of the issue

Recently, concerns have been expressed in relation to several ISDS claims brought by investors under existing investment agreements, relating to measures taken by states affecting the financial sector, notably those taken in times of crisis in order to protect consumers or to maintain the stability and integrity of the financial system.

To address these concerns, some investment agreements have introduced mechanisms which grant the regulators of the Parties to the agreement the possibility to intervene (through a so-called “filter” to ISDS) in particular ISDS cases that involve measures ostensibly taken for prudential reasons. The mechanism enables the Parties to decide whether a measure is indeed taken for prudential reasons, and thus if the impact on the investor concerned is justified. On this basis, the Parties may therefore agree that a claim should not proceed.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

The majority of existing investment agreements privilege the original intention of such agreements, which was to avoid the politicisation of disputes, and therefore do not contain provisions or mechanisms which allow the Parties the possibility to intervene under particular circumstances in ISDS cases.

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU like many other states considers it important to protect the right to regulate in the financial sector and, more broadly, the overriding need to maintain the overall stability and integrity of the financial system, while also recognizing the speed needed for government action in case of financial crisis.

Link to reference text

Some investment agreements include filter mechanisms whereby the Parties to the agreement (here the EU and the US) may intervene in ISDS cases where an investor seeks to challenge measures adopted pursuant to prudential rules for financial stability. In such cases the Parties may decide jointly that a claim should not proceed any further. Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what are your views on the use and scope of such filter mechanisms in the TTIP agreement?

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées pour la mise en place d’un « filtre » ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. Il n’est pas évident de savoir pourquoi cette mesure ne concerne que le secteur financier et pas l’ensemble des mesures touchant les intérêts publics.

Explanation of the Issue

When countries negotiate an agreement, they have a common understanding of what they want the agreement to mean. However, there is a risk that any tribunal, including ISDS tribunals interprets the agreement in a different way, upsetting the balance that the countries in question had achieved in negotiations – for example, between investment protection and the right to regulate. This is the case if the agreement leaves room for interpretation. It is therefore necessary to have mechanisms which will allow the Parties (the EU and the US) to clarify their intentions on how the agreement should be interpreted.

Approach in existing investment agreements

Most existing investment agreements do not permit the countries who signed the agreement in question to take part in proceedings nor to give directions to the ISDS tribunal on issues of interpretation.

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU will make it possible for the non-disputing Party (i.e. the EU or the US) to intervene in ISDS proceedings between an investor and the other Party. This means that in each case, the Parties can explain to the arbitrators and to the Appellate Body how they would want the relevant provisions to be interpreted.  Where both Parties agree on the interpretation, such interpretation is a very powerful statement, which ISDS tribunals would have to respect.

The EU would also provide for the Parties (i.e. the EU and the US) to adopt binding interpretations on issues of law, so as to correct or avoid interpretations by tribunals which might be considered to be against the common intentions of the EU and the US. Given the EU’s intention to give clarity and precision to the investment protection obligations of the agreement, the scope for undesirable interpretations by ISDS tribunals is very limited. However, this provision is an additional safety-valve for the Parties.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on this approach to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement to correct the balance? Are these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to be sufficient?

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées concernant la possibilité pour les États-Unis et l’UE de convenir d’une interprétation contraignante de l’accord ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. Il convient d’ajouter que l’efficacité de ces directives d’interprétation pourrait assez facilement être mise en doute, en particulier leur caractère obligatoire. L’expérience dans le cadre de l’ALENA l’a montré. Celles-ci pourraient par exemple être écartées au motif qu’elles ne constituent pas une interprétation du texte en vigueur mais un amendement de celui-ci, un amendement non-obligatoire dans la mesure où celui-ci n’a pas été adopté conformément à la procédure prévue par l’accord (ex : Pope and Talbot vs Canada). En tout état de cause, dans le cadre de l’ALENA, les tribunaux arbitraux ont examiné le contenu et la signification de ces directives d’interprétation.

Explanation of the issue

In existing investment agreements, the decision by an ISDS tribunal is final. There is no possibility for the responding state, for example, to appeal to a higher instance to challenge the level of compensation or other aspects of the ISDS decision except on very limited procedural grounds. There are concerns that this can lead to different or even contradictory interpretations of the provisions of international investment agreements. There have been calls by stakeholders for a mechanism to allow for appeal to increase legitimacy of the system and to ensure uniformity of interpretation.

  

Approach in most existing investment agreements

No existing international investment agreements provide for an appeal on legal issues. International arbitration rules allow for annulment of ISDS rulings under certain very restrictive conditions relating to procedural issues. 

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU aims to establish an appellate mechanism in TTIP so as to allow for review of ISDS rulings. It will help ensure consistency in the interpretation of TTIP and provide both the government and the investor with the opportunity to appeal against awards and to correct errors. This legal review is an additional check on the work of the arbitrators who have examined the case in the first place.

In agreements under negotiation by the EU, the possibility of creating an appellate mechanism in the future is envisaged. However, in TTIP the EU intends to go further and create a bilateral appellate mechanism immediately through the agreement.

Link to reference text

Question 12. Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the creation of an appellate mechanism in TTIP as a means to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement.

Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis. Les nouvelles dispositions proposées concernant la mise en place d’un mécanisme d’appel ne sont pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes majeures que soulève le RDIE. Il s’agit là uniquement d’une possibilité très incertaine et qui plus est subordonnée à l’accord futur des parties ! On peut donc se demander si ce mécanisme verra le jour. En tout état de cause, la mise en place d’un tel mécanisme d’appel est envisagée dans le texte de référence comme la toute dernière option. De plus, tous les détails concernant ce mécanisme sont encore à prévoir, depuis la composition du comité à la procédure de soumission des demandes, ou encore la portée des décisions adoptées dans ce cadre. Force est de constater que le texte de référence ne fait que repousser cette question à plus tard, ce qui est inacceptable.

C. General assessment

General assessment
  • What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of protection and ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US?
  • Do you see other ways for the EU to improve the investment system?
  • Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the questionnaire that you would like to address?

Notons tout d’abord que l’introduction d’un mécanisme de règlement des différends dans l’accord avec les États-Unis n’est en aucun cas indispensable. Il ne constitue pas la seule ou la meilleure protection des investissements. Il n’est absolument pas incohérent d’inclure un tel mécanisme dans le cadre de certaines relations bilatérales et de l’exclure lorsqu’il ne se justifie pas, comme en l’espèce. Les organisations membres de la Plateforme PTCI/TTIP s’opposent fermement à l’introduction d’un tel mécanisme dans l’accord de partenariat avec les États-Unis pour les raisons suivantes : • Les investisseurs étrangers sont surprotégés. Ils disposent en effet d’ores et déjà de deux mécanismes de protection, à savoir un recours devant les juridictions nationales et la protection diplomatique. Un tel mécanisme leur donnerait donc un avantage par rapport aux investisseurs nationaux, qui ne peuvent avoir recours à l’arbitrage. De plus, un chapitre de ce type accorde des droits mais n’envisage aucune obligation pour les investisseurs (l’État ne peut qu’être défendeur), alors que les concepts utilisés en matière de responsabilité sociale des entreprises ou encore dans les principes directeurs de l’OCDE pour les entreprises multinationales sont facilement transposables dans ce genre d’accord. Il s’agit ici d’une occasion de rendre certaines de ces obligations contraignantes dans le cadre du RDIE, mais également de façon générale. Les investisseurs ne devraient bénéficier de la protection prévue par le chapitre sur l’investissement qu’à la condition de satisfaire plusieurs obligations minimales. Les Parties devraient également conserver la possibilité de contrôler l’admission des investissements sur leur territoire, et par ce biais promouvoir les normes environnementales et sociales. • Le problème des concepts : le droit international est seul applicable et utilise des concepts purement internationaux parfois éloignés des préoccupations nationales. • Les coûts : ceux-ci sont très élevés (8 millions de dollars US en moyenne) quelle que soit l’issue de la procédure. Face à de tel montant, il parait illusoire de concevoir qu’un grand nombre d’entreprises pourront bénéficier en pratique du mécanisme de RDIE. • Un chapitre à part : si l’on observe les accords de libre-échange conclus antérieurement, le chapitre sur l’investissement est le seul à faire l’objet d’un mécanisme de sanction particulier. Cette possibilité de recours à l’arbitrage ne privilégie donc qu’un seul type d’acteur économique, les investisseurs. • Les arguments habituels en faveur de ce mécanisme sont sans valeur dans le contexte de ces négociations (dépolitiser / délocaliser / assurer l’application du droit international / permettre aux investisseurs de mener la procédure eux-mêmes / éviter les dénis de justice). Compte tenu du fait qu’une défaillance du système judiciaire est difficilement concevable dans ces deux zones du globe, ces arguments ne peuvent convaincre. • L’effet dissuasif et l’instrumentalisation potentielle de ce mécanisme : il est en effet possible que la perspective de recours futurs puisse avoir un effet dissuasif sur les initiatives législatives des États parties. Un tel mécanisme pourrait également être utilisé comme un outil de lobbying.