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Respondent details

  • CHAVENT Yves
  • EU citizen
  • Country: France
  • Activity: Je suis avocat honoraire en France
  • Transparency register: No
  • Prior investment in the US: No


A. Substantive investment protection provisions

Explanation of the issue

The scope of the agreement responds to a key question: What type of investments and investors should be protected? Our response is that investment protection should apply to those investments and to investors that have made an investment in accordance with the laws of the country where they have invested.

Approach in most investment agreements

Many international investment agreements have broad provisions defining “investor” and “investment”.

In most cases, the definition of “investment” is intentionally broad, as investment is generally a complex operation that may involve a wide range of assets, such as land, buildings, machinery, equipment, intellectual property rights, contracts, licences, shares, bonds, and various financial instruments. At the same time, most bilateral investment agreements refer to “investments made in accordance with applicable law”. This reference has worked well and has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse to grant investment protection to investors who have not respected the law of the host state when making the investment (for example, by structuring the investment in such a way as to circumvent clear prohibitions in the law of the host state, or by procuring an investment fraudulently or through bribery).

In many investment agreements, the definition of “investor” simply refers to natural and juridical persons of the other Party to the agreement, without further refinement. This has allowed in some cases so–called “shell” or “mailbox” companies, owned or controlled by nationals or companies not intended to be protected by the agreement and having no real business activities in the country concerned, to make use of an investment agreement to launch claims before an ISDS tribunal.

The EU's objectives and approach

The EU wants to avoid abuse. This is achieved primarily by improving the definition of “investor”, thus eliminating so –called “shell” or “mailbox” companies owned by nationals of third countries from the scope: in order to qualify as a legitimate investor of a Party, a juridical person must have substantial business activities in the territory of that Party.

At the same time, the EU wants to rely on past treaty practice with a proven track record. The reference to “investments made in accordance with the applicable law” is one such example. Another is the clarification that protection is only granted in situations where investors have already committed substantial resources in the host state - and not when they are simply at the stage where they are planning to do so.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of the substantive investment protection provisions in TTIP?

Je ne comprends pas la référence faite à ce stade aux tribunaux d'arbitrage. Les juridictions des états membres de l'UE (ou celles désignées par les traités à cet effet) sont parfaitement apte à traiter les litiges soulevés par des investisseurs mécontents. Il existe des lois dans tous les Etats membres de l’UE qui garantissent les investissements. De plus les accords internationaux (OMC…) les garantissent également. Alors pourquoi ajouter de la complexité juridique à ce qui existe et mettre de plus ces nouveaux ‘’mécanismes’’ au-dessus des souverainetés des Etats ? On constate d’ailleurs que le type de mécanisme de règlement des différents investisseurs contre États, mis en place dans les accords bilatéraux, permettent à de grands groupes multinationaux, extra territorialisés, de demander à des États des compensations exorbitantes. Ces tribunaux privés vont donner des armes supplémentaires à ces grandes entreprises pour maximiser leurs profits de façon indue au détriment des citoyens européens. Le nombre croissant de litiges en 2012 (+ de 500) montre bien que ces dispositifs incite les investisseurs à engager des procédures et oblige les Etats à des frais (avocats, procédures…) coûteux, auquel s’ajoute le risque d’une condamnation pécuniaire. L’éviction des sociétés écran est à l’évidence nécessaire ; mais très insuffisante. On constate aujourd’hui que les grands investisseurs américains ont désintégré leur chaîne de valorisation, pour des raisons fiscales mais pas seulement, installant un siège social aux Pays-Bas, un siège fiscal au Luxembourg, les droits de propriété intellectuelle en Irlande, un centre d’exportation, par exemple de bananes, à Jersey, etc. Chacune de ces sociétés pourra se prévaloir d’un « réel » chiffre d’affaires, et donc intenter une action contre un État membre qui prétendrait mettre un terme à ce détournement du droit national.

Explanation of the issue

Under the standards of non-discriminatory treatment of investors, a state Party to the agreement commits itself to treat foreign investors from the other Party in the same way in which it treats its own investors (national treatment), as well in the same way in which it treats investors from other countries (most-favoured nation treatment). This ensures a level playing field between foreign investors and local investors or investors from other countries. For instance, if a certain chemical substance were to be proven to be toxic to health, and the state took a decision that it should be prohibited, the state should not impose this prohibition only on foreign companies, while allowing domestic ones to continue to produce and sell that substance.

Non-discrimination obligations may apply after the foreign investor has made the investment in accordance with the applicable law (post-establishment), but they may also apply to the conditions of access of that investor to the market of the host country (pre-establishment).  

Approach in most existing investment agreements

The standards of national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment are considered to be key provisions of investment agreements and therefore they have been consistently included in such agreements, although with some variation in substance.

Regarding national treatment, many investment agreements do not allow states to discriminate between a domestic and a foreign investor once the latter is already established in a Party’s territory. Other agreements, however, allow such discrimination to take place in a limited number of sectors.

Regarding MFN, most investment agreements do not clarify whether foreign investors are entitled to take advantage of procedural or substantive provisions contained in other past or future agreements concluded by the host country. Thus, investors may be able to claim that they are entitled to benefit from any provision of another agreement that they consider to be more favourable, which may even permit the application of an entirely new standard of protection that was not found in the original agreement. In practice, this is commonly referred to as "importation of standards".

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU considers that, as a matter of principle, established investors should not be discriminated against after they have established in the territory of the host country, while at the same recognises that in certain rare cases and in some very specific sectors, discrimination against already established investors may need to be envisaged. The situation is different with regard to the right of establishment, where the Parties may choose whether or not to open certain markets or sectors, as they see fit.

On the "importation of standards" issue, the EU seeks to clarify that MFN does not allow procedural or substantive provisions to be imported from other agreements.

The EU also includes exceptions allowing the Parties to take measures relating to the protection of health, the environment, consumers, etc. Additional carve-outs would apply to the audio-visual sector and the granting of subsidies. These are typically included in EU FTAs and also apply to the non-discrimination obligations relating to investment. Such exceptions allow differences in treatment between investors and investments where necessary to achieve public policy objectives.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanations and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the EU approach to non –discrimination in relation to the TTIP? Please explain.

Le traité avec le Canada donné en exemple ne comporte aucune disposition contre l’importation des clauses plus favorables. Les explications données ci-dessus ne comportent pas plus de précision. Par conséquent, l’importation de clauses de la nation la plus favorisée sera possible. Par exemple, la France est devenue un paradis fiscal pour les investisseurs qataris. Donc, les investisseurs américains pourront réclamer les mêmes avantages.

Explanation of the issue

The obligation to grant foreign investors fair and equitable treatment (FET) is one of the key investment protection standards. It ensures that investors and investments are protected against treatment by the host country which, even if not expropriatory or discriminatory, is still unacceptable because it is arbitrary, unfair, abusive, etc. 

Approach in most investment agreements

The FET standard is present in most international investment agreements. However, in many cases the standard is not defined, and it is usually not limited or clarified. Inevitably, this has given arbitral tribunals significant room for interpretation, and the interpretations adopted by arbitral tribunals have varied from very narrow to very broad, leading to much controversy about the precise meaning of the standard. This lack of clarity has fueled a large number of ISDS claims by investors, some of which have raised concern with regard to the states' right to regulate. In particular, in some cases, the standard has been understood to encompass the protection of the legitimate expectations of investors in a very broad way, including the expectation of a stable general legislative framework.

Certain investment agreements have narrowed down the content of the FET standard by linking it to concepts that are considered to be part of customary international law, such as the minimum standard of treatment that countries must respect in relation to the treatment accorded to foreigners. However, this has also resulted in a wide range of differing arbitral tribunal decisions on what is or is not covered by customary international law, and has not brought the desired greater clarity to the definition of the standard. An issue sometimes linked to the FET standard is the respect by the host country of its legal obligations towards the foreign investors and their investments (sometimes referred to as an "umbrella clause"), e.g. when the host country has entered into a contract with the foreign investor. Investment agreements may have specific provisions to this effect, which have sometimes been interpreted broadly as implying that every breach of e.g. a contractual obligation could constitute a breach of the investment agreement.

EU objectives and approach

The main objective of the EU is to clarify the standard, in particular by incorporating key lessons learned from case-law. This would eliminate uncertainty for both states and investors.

Under this approach, a state could be held responsible for a breach of the fair and equitable treatment obligation only for breaches of a limited set of basic rights, namely: the denial of justice; the disregard of the fundamental principles of due process; manifest arbitrariness; targeted discrimination based on gender, race or religious belief; and abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress or harassment. This list may be extended only where the Parties (the EU and the US) specifically agree to add such elements to the content of the standard, for instance where there is evidence that new elements of the standard have emerged from international law.

The “legitimate expectations” of the investor may be taken into account in the interpretation of the standard. However, this is possible only where clear, specific representations have been made by a Party to the agreement in order to convince the investor to make or maintain the investment and upon which the investor relied, and that were subsequently not respected by that Party. The intention is to make it clear that an investor cannot legitimately expect that the general regulatory and legal regime will not change. Thus the EU intends to ensure that the standard is not understood to be a “stabilisation obligation”, in other words a guarantee that the legislation of the host state will not change in a way that might negatively affect investors. In line with the general objective of clarifying the content of the standard, the EU shall also strive, where necessary, to provide protection to foreign investors in situations in which the host state uses its sovereign powers to avoid contractual obligations towards foreign investors or their investments, without however covering ordinary contractual breaches like the non-payment of an invoice.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors and their investments in relation to the TTIP?

On ne voit pas pourquoi l'Union offrirait une protection aux investisseurs étrangers. C'est la législation (harmonisée) de chaque état membre qui assure cette protection, sous le controle des juridictions des états membres et de l'interprétation de la CJUE. Le texte indique : « un État ne pourrait être tenu pour responsable d’une violation de l’obligation de traitement juste et équitable que si certains droits de base ont été bafoués, comme le déni de justice, la méconnaissance des droits fondamentaux de la défense, l’arbitraire manifeste,… et les traitements abusifs, tels que la coercition, la contrainte ou le harcèlement ». Or les États-Unis pratiquent systématiquement ce genre de traitement envers les investisseurs dans le cadre de poursuites pénales lancées par leurs procureurs et autres autorités de supervision contre des investisseurs tant étrangers qu’américains, les menaçant de confisquer tout ou une partie de propriétés et supprimer leurs droits aux États-Unis s’ils ne consentent pas à avouer des pratiques prétendument condamnables aux États-Unis et à payer des amendes gigantesques, selon des procédures secrètes qui violent manifestement tous les droits de la défense. Tant le traité canadien que les explications données ne prévoient aucune protection contre ces dénis de justice, ces violations des droits de la défense, cet arbitraire manifeste, et tous ces traitement abusifs qui s’apparentent à du chantage, à du racket et à de l’extorsion.

Explanation of the issue

The right to property is a human right, enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as in the legal tradition of EU Member States. This right is crucial to investors and investments. Indeed, the greatest risk that investors may incur in a foreign country is the risk of having their investment expropriated without compensation. This is why the guarantees against expropriation are placed at the core of any international investment agreement.

Direct expropriations, which entail the outright seizure of a property right, do not occur often nowadays and usually do not generate controversy in arbitral practice. However, arbitral tribunals are confronted with a much more difficult task when it comes to assessing whether a regulatory measure of a state, which does not entail the direct transfer of the property right, might be considered equivalent to expropriation (indirect expropriation).

Approach in most investment agreements

In investment agreements, expropriations are permitted if they are for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, resulting from the due process of law and are accompanied by prompt and effective compensation. This applies to both direct expropriation (such as nationalisation) and indirect expropriation (a measure having an effect equivalent to expropriation).

Indirect expropriation has been a source of concern in certain cases where regulatory measures taken for legitimate purposes have been subject to investor claims for compensation, on the grounds that such measures were equivalent to expropriation because of their significant negative impact on investment. Most investment agreements do not provide details or guidance in this respect, which has inevitably left arbitral tribunals with significant room for interpretation.

The EU's objectives and approach

The objective of the EU is to clarify the provisions on expropriation and to provide interpretative guidance with regard to indirect expropriation in order to avoid claims against legitimate public policy measures.  The EU wants to make it clear that non-discriminatory measures taken for legitimate public purposes, such as to protect health or the environment, cannot be considered equivalent to an expropriation, unless they are manifestly excessive in light of their purpose. The EU also wants to clarify that the simple fact that a measure has an impact on the economic value of the investment does not justify a claim that an indirect expropriation has occurred.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion of the approach to dealing with expropriation in relation to the TTIP? Please explain.

Le droit de propriété est protégé mais n'est pas absolu. Il s'exerce dans les limites de la réglementation qui lui est applicable. Les objectifs et ligne de conduite de l'UE sont suffisamment flous pour autoriser toutes les interprétation. Mesures publiques légitimes, fins publiques légitimes, mesures manifestement excessives, ces termes sont trop flous et permettent toutes les interprétations comme le montrent les avis divergents en matière de santé publique entre les organismes habilités aux USA et en Europe (hormones, pesticides, etc). Certes le droit de propriété est un droit fondamental, mais il n’est pas le seul et il n’est pas supérieur aux autres. Tous les droits fondamentaux doivent être respectés par les États, mais aussi par les investisseurs, ce qui est loin d’être le cas, or rien n’est dit à ce sujet. Ici aussi le principe de réciprocité doit s’appliquer. Par ailleurs, le droit de propriété est explicitement exclu des compétences de l’Union européenne par l’article 345 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union (avec la seule exception des droits de propriété intellectuelle) : « Article 345 Les traités ne préjugent en rien le régime de la propriété dans les États membres. » Les dispositions envisagées ne sont donc pas du ressort de l’Union européenne ; elles violent le traité et le principe de subsidiarité

Explanation of the issue

In democratic societies, the right to regulate of states is subject to principles and rules contained in both domestic legislation and in international law. For instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Contracting States commit themselves to guarantee a number of civil and political rights. In the EU, the Constitutions of the Member States, as well as EU law, ensure that the actions of the state cannot go against fundamental rights of the citizens. Hence, public regulation must be based on a legitimate purpose and be necessary in a democratic society.

Investment agreements reflect this perspective. Nevertheless, wherever such agreements contain provisions that appear to be very broad or ambiguous, there is always a risk that the arbitral tribunals interpret them in a manner which may be perceived as a threat to the state's right to regulate. In the end, the decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good as the provisions that they have to interpret and apply.

 Approach in most investment agreements

Most agreements that are focused on investment protection are silent about how public policy issues, such as public health, environmental protection, consumer protection or prudential regulation, might interact with investment. Consequently, the relationship between the protection of investments and the right to regulate in such areas, as envisaged by the contracting Parties to such agreements is not clear and this creates uncertainty.

In more recent agreements, however, this concern is increasingly addressed through, on the one hand, clarification of the key investment protection provisions that have proved to be controversial in the past and, on the other hand, carefully drafted exceptions to certain commitments. In complex agreements such as free trade agreements with provisions on investment, or regional integration agreements, the inclusion of such safeguards is the usual practice.

The EU's objectives and approach

The objective of the EU is to achieve a solid balance between the protection of investors and the Parties' right to regulate.

First of all, the EU wants to make sure that the Parties' right to regulate is confirmed as a basic underlying principle. This is important, as arbitral tribunals will have to take this principle into account when assessing any dispute settlement case.

Secondly, the EU will introduce clear and innovative provisions with regard to investment protection standards that have raised concern in the past (for instance, the standard of fair and equitable treatment is defined based on a closed list of basic rights; the annex on expropriation clarifies that non-discriminatory measures for legitimate public policy objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation). These improvements will ensure that investment protection standards cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a way that is detrimental to the right to regulate.

Third, the EU will ensure that all the necessary safeguards and exceptions are in place. For instance, foreign investors should be able to establish in the EU only under the terms and conditions defined by the EU. A list of horizontal exceptions will apply to non-discrimination obligations, in relation to measures such as those taken in the field of environmental protection, consumer protection or health (see question 2 for details). Additional carve-outs would apply to the audiovisual sector and the granting of subsidies. Decisions on competition matters will not be subject to investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Furthermore, in line with other EU agreements, nothing in the agreement would prevent a Party from taking measures for prudential reasons, including measures for the protection of depositors or measures to ensure the integrity and stability of its financial system. In addition, EU agreements contain general exceptions applying in situations of crisis, such as in circumstances of serious difficulties for the operation of the exchange rate policy or monetary policy, balance of payments or external financial difficulties, or threat thereof.

In terms of the procedural aspects relating to ISDS, the objective of the EU is to build a system capable of adapting to the states' right to regulate. Wherever greater clarity and precision proves necessary in order to protect the right to regulate, the Parties will have the possibility to adopt interpretations of the investment protection provisions which will be binding on arbitral tribunals.  This will allow the Parties to oversee how the agreement is interpreted in practice and, where necessary, to influence the interpretation.

The procedural improvements proposed by the EU will also make it clear that an arbitral tribunal will not be able to order the repeal of a measure, but only compensation for the investor.

Furthermore, frivolous claims will be prevented and investors who bring claims unsuccessfully will pay the costs of the government concerned (see question 9).

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what is your opinion with regard to the way the right to regulate is dealt with in the EU's approach to TTIP?

Les explications ci-dessus comportent un beau discours sur l'effectivité des politiques publiques dans les pays de l'UE, mais les orientations sont en fait une limitation de ces politiques publiques pour répondre à la protection des "investisseurs" (plus que des investissements). La disposition envisagée ne résout le problème soulevé qu’à moitié. Si elle empêche d’exiger l’abrogation d’une mesure, elle permet d’ordonner l’indemnisation de l’investisseur. Ceci est de nature à dissuader l’État membre de prendre une mesure réglementaire qui risque de lui coûter cher. Le projet de directive sur la résolution des banques prévoit l’annulation de la valeur des actions d’une banque mise en résolution, et d’une partie des obligations qu’elle a émises ; les détenteurs de ces titres pourront-ils demander des dédommagements aux autorités européennes pour les pertes ainsi subies (comme Ping An l’a fait contre la Belgique en 2012 en réclamant 3,7 milliards d’euros de compensations) ? Le projet de règlement européen sur la séparation des banques pourrait s’analyser comme une perte des subventions implicites aux filiales banques d’affaires par la banque de dépôt, et donner lieu également à des demandes d’indemnisation. En effet, le texte prévoit qu’il reviendra aux autorités européennes d’apporter la preuve que ces mesures prises ne sont pas excessives (“these (prudential) measures shall not be more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim”.) Des mesures de sauvegarde sont prévues dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, mais pas pour plus de six mois. Pourtant, la crise économique et financière dure depuis six ans, et les mesures correctrices sont loin d’avoir encore été toutes mises en place ; ce délai de six mois est absurdement réduit.

B. Investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS)

Explanation of the issue

In most ISDS cases, no or little information is made available to the public, hearings are not open and third parties are not allowed to intervene in the proceedings. This makes it difficult for the public to know the basic facts and to evaluate the claims being brought by either side.

This lack of openness has given rise to concern and confusion with regard to the causes and potential outcomes of ISDS disputes. Transparency is essential to ensure the legitimacy and accountability of the system. It enables stakeholders interested in a dispute to be informed and contribute to the proceedings. It fosters accountability in arbitrators, as their decisions are open to scrutiny. It contributes to consistency and predictability as it helps create a body of cases and information that can be relied on by investors, stakeholders, states and ISDS tribunals.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

Under the rules that apply in most existing agreements, both the responding state and the investor need to agree to permit the publication of submissions. If either the investor or the responding state does not agree to publication, documents cannot be made public. As a result, most ISDS cases take place behind closed doors and no or a limited number of documents are made available to the public.

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU's aim is to ensure transparency and openness in the ISDS system under TTIP. The EU will include provisions to guarantee that hearings are open and that all documents are available to the public. In ISDS cases brought under TTIP, all documents will be publicly available (subject only to the protection of confidential information and business secrets) and hearings will be open to the public. Interested parties from civil society will be able to file submissions to make their views and arguments known to the ISDS tribunal. 

The EU took a leading role in establishing new United Nations rules on transparency[1] in ISDS. The objective of transparency will be achieved by incorporating these rules into TTIP.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on whether this approach contributes to the objective of the EU to increase transparency and openness in the ISDS system for TTIP. Please indicate any additional suggestions you may have.

Il est écrit que les dispositions du partenariat transatlantique ne peuvent être invoquées devant un tribunal national. J'ignore d'où provient cette affirmation qui me parait étonnament erronée: en FRance charque partie peut invoquer les traités internationaux devant les juridictions nationales dès lors qu'ils ont un effet direct sur la situation des parties. Il y a donc là un vice fondamental de la réflexion. Pourquoi faire compliqué quand on peut faire simple ? Pourquoi ajouter un système spécifique de RDIE puisqu'il existe des juridictions apte à répondre à ces questions sous le controle de la CJUE pour l'application des principes fondamentaux des traités??? Les règles de transparence de l’UNCITRAL paraissent bonnes dans leurs principes, sauf qu’elles restreignent la publication des pièces du litige en respectant les informations « confidentielles ou protégées » (Article x-33: Transparency of Proceedings), du traité avec le Canada, point 4. Or la proposition de directive du Conseil et de la Commission sur le secret d’affaires donnent au chef d’entreprise pratiquement tout pouvoir pour décider de ce qui est un secret d’affaires ; et par conséquent tout pouvoir pour en limiter la publication, ce qui vide ces prétendues règles de transparence de leur force.

Explanation of the issue

Investors who consider that they have grounds to complain about action taken by the authorities (e.g. discrimination or lack of compensation after expropriation) often have different options. They may be able to go to domestic courts and seek redress there. They or any related companies may be able to go to other international tribunals under other international investment treaties.

It is often the case that protection offered in investment agreements cannot be invoked before domestic courts and the applicable legal rules are different. For example, discrimination in favour of local companies is not prohibited under US law but is prohibited in investment agreements. There are also concerns that, in some cases domestic courts may favour the local government over the foreign investor e.g. when assessing a claim for compensation for expropriation or may deny due process rights such as the effective possibility to appeal. Governments may have immunity from being sued. In addition, the remedies are often different. In some cases government measures can be reversed by domestic courts, for example if they are illegal or unconstitutional. ISDS tribunals cannot order governments to reverse measures.

These different possibilities raise important and complex issues. It is important to make sure that a government does not pay more than the correct compensation. It is also important to ensure consistency between rulings.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

Existing investment agreements generally do not regulate or address the relationship with domestic courts or other ISDS tribunals. Some agreements require that the investor choses between domestic courts and ISDS tribunals. This is often referred to as "fork in the road" clause.

The EU’s objectives and approach

As a matter of principle, the EU’s approach favours domestic courts. The EU aims to provide incentives for investors to pursue claims in domestic courts or to seek amicable solutions – such as mediation. The EU will suggest different instruments to do this. One is to prolong the relevant time limits if an investor goes to domestic courts or mediation on the same matter, so as not to discourage an investor from pursuing these avenues.  Another important element is to make sure that investors cannot bring claims on the same matter at the same time in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic courts. The EU will also ensure that companies affiliated with the investor cannot bring claims in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic courts on the same matter and at the same time. If there are other relevant or related cases, ISDS tribunals must take these into account. This is done to avoid any risk that the investor is over-compensated and helps to ensure consistency by excluding the possibility for parallel claims.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the effectiveness of this approach for balancing access to ISDS with possible recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness of mediation as a means to settle disputes.

La ligne de conduite adoptée par la Commission n’est pas efficace pour établir un « juste équilibre » entre accès au RDIE et recours possible aux tribunaux nationaux. Du reste, la rédaction même de la question le montre bien, puisqu’elle met en balance l’accès au RDIE et le recours « possible » aux tribunaux nationaux. Il est donc évident pour tout le monde, y compris pour la Commission, qu’une arme supplémentaire est donnée aux grands investisseurs pour attaquer les États, mais que le recours aux tribunaux nationaux restera néanmoins « possible ». La question sur le juste équilibre n’est ici qu’une figure de rhétorique. Le texte envisagé donne le choix à l’investisseur de passer par la voie arbitrale ou par la voie du tribunal national (ou européen). De deux choses l’une : •ou bien nos droits européens sont suffisamment protecteurs, et l’investisseur doit être obligé de passer par le tribunal national ; après quoi, s’il estime avoir été désavantagé, il aurait le droit de faire appel, éventuellement devant une instance européenne ; •ou bien ce n’est pas le cas, et notre droit doit d’abord être amélioré. Le recours à la médiation est évidemment souhaitable, mais il existe déjà. La Commission demande des suggestions de « mesures supplémentaires ». En l’occurrence, il ne faut pas des mesures supplémentaires, mais tout simplement la suppression de la possibilité offerte aux investisseurs d’attaquer les États devant des tribunaux privés, plus ou moins à leur solde

Explanation of the issue

There is concern that arbitrators on ISDS tribunals do not always act in an independent and impartial manner. Because the individuals in question may not only act as arbitrators, but also as lawyers for companies or governments, concerns have been expressed as to potential bias or conflicts of interest.

Some have also expressed concerns about the qualifications of arbitrators and that they may not have the necessary qualifications on matters of public interest or on matters that require a balancing between investment protection and e.g. environment, health or consumer protection.

Approach in existing investment agreements

  Most existing investment agreements do not address the issue of the conduct or behaviour of arbitrators. International rules on arbitration address the issue by allowing the responding government or the investor to challenge the choice of arbitrator because of concerns of suitability.

Most agreements allow the investor and the responding state to select arbitrators but do not establish rules on the qualifications or a list of approved, qualified arbitrators to draw from.

  The EU’s objective and approach

The EU aims to establish clear rules to ensure that arbitrators are independent and act ethically. The EU will introduce specific requirements in the TTIP on the ethical conduct of arbitrators, including a code of conduct. This code of conduct will be binding on arbitrators in ISDS tribunals set up under TTIP.  The code of conduct also establishes procedures to identify and deal with any conflicts of interest.  Failure to abide by these ethical rules will result in the removal of the arbitrator from the tribunal. For example, if a responding state considers that the arbitrator chosen by the investor does not have the necessary qualifications or that he has a conflict of interest, the responding state can challenge the appointment. If the arbitrator is in breach of the Code of Conduct, he/she will be removed from the tribunal. In case the ISDS tribunal has already rendered its award and a breach of the code of conduct is found, the responding state or the investor can request a reversal of that ISDS finding.

In the text provided as reference (the draft EU-Canada Agreement), the Parties (i.e. the EU and Canada) have agreed for the first time in an investment agreement to include rules on the conduct of arbitrators, and have included the possibility to improve them further if necessary. In the context of TTIP these would be directly included in the agreement.

As regards the qualifications of ISDS arbitrators, the EU aims to set down detailed requirements for the arbitrators who act in ISDS tribunals under TTIP. They must be independent and impartial, with expertise in international law and international investment law and, if possible, experience in international trade law and international dispute resolution. Among those best qualified and who have undertaken such tasks will be retired judges, who generally have experience in ruling on issues that touch upon both trade and investment and on societal and public policy issues. The EU also aims to set up a roster, i.e. a list of qualified individuals from which the Chairperson for the ISDS tribunal is drawn, if the investor or the responding state cannot otherwise agree to a Chairperson. The purpose of such a roster is to ensure that the EU and the US have agreed to and vetted the arbitrators to ensure their abilities and independence.  In this way the responding state chooses one arbitrator and has vetted the third arbitrator.

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Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these procedures and in particular on the Code of Conduct and the requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP agreement. Do they improve the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged?

Une affaire récente en France tend à laisser penser que ni les anciens juges, ni les avocats ne sont nécessairement des arbitres indépendants et impartiaux. En outre (du moins en France), les arbitres peuvent ne pas appliquer le corpus de règles en vigueur mais statuer en équité. En outre des voies d'appel et de recours existent contre les décisions arbitrales. Renoncer à ces voies de recours serait abandonner un droit protégé. Le recours à l'arbitrage pour le RDIE est une complexification supplémentaire dont on se passera, sauf à considérer que les tribunaux d'arbitrage seront toujours plus favorables aux investisseurs !!!! Je ne pense pas que ce soit l'objectif de l'UE. Il faut que l'UE prenne les moyens de ses objectifs et abandonne le système arbitral. Ce n'est pas le nombre d'accord internationaux qui prévoient des tribunaux arbitraux, qui constitue un critère satisfaisant en la matière. Ceci n’est présenté que comme un souhait de l’UE : ce devrait être une condition sine qua non. En outre, qui appréciera qu’un arbitre est en situation de conflit d’intérêt ? Et selon quels critères ? Le fait qu’il a travaillé précédemment pour le plaignant suffira à le faire exclure, même s’il ne travaille plus pour lui ? Et même s’il n’a jamais travaillé pour lui, comment s’assurer qu’il ne le fera pas à l’avenir ? Ces tribunaux privés sont composés de mercenaires judiciaires qui vendent leurs services au plus offrant, ce qui n’est pas le cas avec des magistrats professionnels

Explanation of the issue

As in all legal systems, cases are brought that have little or no chance of succeeding (so-called “frivolous claims”). Despite eventually being rejected by the tribunals, such cases take up time and money for the responding state. There have been concerns that protracted and frequent litigation in ISDS could have an effect on the policy choices made by states. This is why it is important to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to weed out frivolous disputes as early as possible.

Another issue is the cost of ISDS proceedings. In many ISDS cases, even if the responding state is successful in defending its measures in front of the ISDS tribunal, it may have to pay substantial amounts to cover its own defence.

Approach in most existing investment agreements:

Under existing investment agreements, there are generally no rules dealing with frivolous claims. Some arbitration rules however do have provisions on frivolous claims. As a result, there is a risk that frivolous or clearly unfounded claims are allowed to proceed. Even though the investor would lose such claims, the long proceedings and the implied questions surrounding policy can be problematic.

The issue of who bears the cost is also not addressed in most existing investment agreements. Some international arbitration rules have provisions that address the issue of costs in very general terms. In practice, ISDS tribunals have often decided that the investor and responding state pay their own legal costs, regardless of who wins or loses.

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU will introduce several instruments in TTIP to quickly dismiss frivolous claims.

ISDS tribunals will be required to dismiss claims that are obviously without legal merit or legally unfounded. For example, this would be cases where the investor is not established in the US or the EU, or cases where the ISDS tribunal can quickly establish that there is in fact no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors. This provides an early and effective filtering mechanism for frivolous claims thereby avoiding a lengthy litigation process.

To further discourage unfounded claims, the EU is proposing that the losing party should bear all costs of the proceedings. So if investors take a chance at bringing certain claims and fail, they have to pay the full financial costs of this attempt.

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Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on these mechanisms for the avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit frivolous or unfounded claims.

« L’UE entend introduire » ne suffit pas ; cette clause est indispensable. Certes, il faut supprimer toute incitation, mais seulement condamner aux dépens ne suffit pas ; il faut qu’il y ait des contre incitations financières, avec des sanctions réellement dissuasives.

Explanation of the issue

Recently, concerns have been expressed in relation to several ISDS claims brought by investors under existing investment agreements, relating to measures taken by states affecting the financial sector, notably those taken in times of crisis in order to protect consumers or to maintain the stability and integrity of the financial system.

To address these concerns, some investment agreements have introduced mechanisms which grant the regulators of the Parties to the agreement the possibility to intervene (through a so-called “filter” to ISDS) in particular ISDS cases that involve measures ostensibly taken for prudential reasons. The mechanism enables the Parties to decide whether a measure is indeed taken for prudential reasons, and thus if the impact on the investor concerned is justified. On this basis, the Parties may therefore agree that a claim should not proceed.

Approach in most existing investment agreements

The majority of existing investment agreements privilege the original intention of such agreements, which was to avoid the politicisation of disputes, and therefore do not contain provisions or mechanisms which allow the Parties the possibility to intervene under particular circumstances in ISDS cases.

The EU’s objectives and approach

The EU like many other states considers it important to protect the right to regulate in the financial sector and, more broadly, the overriding need to maintain the overall stability and integrity of the financial system, while also recognizing the speed needed for government action in case of financial crisis.

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Some investment agreements include filter mechanisms whereby the Parties to the agreement (here the EU and the US) may intervene in ISDS cases where an investor seeks to challenge measures adopted pursuant to prudential rules for financial stability. In such cases the Parties may decide jointly that a claim should not proceed any further. Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, what are your views on the use and scope of such filter mechanisms in the TTIP agreement?

En matière de services financiers Les services de l'UE feraient mieux de s'occuper (activement) de l'élimination des paradis fiscaux et de l'harmonisation fiscale (les sservices financiers jouant souvent sur les divergences en la matière). Avis totalement défavorable. Les services financiers, à supposer qu’ils fassent partie de l’accord, sont de nature essentielle et systémique et ne doivent en aucun cas être sujets à des arbitrages privés. L’éventuel filtrage ne serait fait que si les parties le décident conjointement ; par conséquent, en cas de désaccord, il n’y aura pas de filtrage, et l’arbitrage se poursuivra. L’accord CETA donné en exemple renvoie en fait la décision à un obscur « comité des services financiers » qui n’est défini nulle part, et ne change rien à la nécessité que les parrties soient d’accord pour filtrer.

Explanation of the Issue

When countries negotiate an agreement, they have a common understanding of what they want the agreement to mean. However, there is a risk that any tribunal, including ISDS tribunals interprets the agreement in a different way, upsetting the balance that the countries in question had achieved in negotiations – for example, between investment protection and the right to regulate. This is the case if the agreement leaves room for interpretation. It is therefore necessary to have mechanisms which will allow the Parties (the EU and the US) to clarify their intentions on how the agreement should be interpreted.

Approach in existing investment agreements

Most existing investment agreements do not permit the countries who signed the agreement in question to take part in proceedings nor to give directions to the ISDS tribunal on issues of interpretation.

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU will make it possible for the non-disputing Party (i.e. the EU or the US) to intervene in ISDS proceedings between an investor and the other Party. This means that in each case, the Parties can explain to the arbitrators and to the Appellate Body how they would want the relevant provisions to be interpreted.  Where both Parties agree on the interpretation, such interpretation is a very powerful statement, which ISDS tribunals would have to respect.

The EU would also provide for the Parties (i.e. the EU and the US) to adopt binding interpretations on issues of law, so as to correct or avoid interpretations by tribunals which might be considered to be against the common intentions of the EU and the US. Given the EU’s intention to give clarity and precision to the investment protection obligations of the agreement, the scope for undesirable interpretations by ISDS tribunals is very limited. However, this provision is an additional safety-valve for the Parties.

Link to reference text

Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on this approach to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement to correct the balance? Are these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to be sufficient?

« L’UE entend également donner aux parties (l’UE et les États-Unis) la possibilité d’adopter des interprétations contraignantes sur des points de droit, de manière à corriger ou éviter toute interprétation par un tribunal pouvant être considérée comme contraire aux intentions communes de l’UE et des États-Unis. Étant donné que l’UE entend clarifier et préciser les obligations de protection des investissements contenues dans l’accord, la possibilité d’une interprétation contraire aux intentions des parties par les tribunaux de RDIE sera très limitée. » On ne voit rien de tel dans le traité avec le Canada. Des interprétations contraignantes nécessiteraient un accord entre les États-Unis et l’Union, accord que rien ne garantit. Prétendre que la marge de manœuvre des tribunaux privés sera très limitée, c’est ne rien connaître à l’entière liberté que ces tribunaux se donnent de décider selon leur bon plaisir, ou plutôt celui de leurs commanditaires.

Explanation of the issue

In existing investment agreements, the decision by an ISDS tribunal is final. There is no possibility for the responding state, for example, to appeal to a higher instance to challenge the level of compensation or other aspects of the ISDS decision except on very limited procedural grounds. There are concerns that this can lead to different or even contradictory interpretations of the provisions of international investment agreements. There have been calls by stakeholders for a mechanism to allow for appeal to increase legitimacy of the system and to ensure uniformity of interpretation.


Approach in most existing investment agreements

No existing international investment agreements provide for an appeal on legal issues. International arbitration rules allow for annulment of ISDS rulings under certain very restrictive conditions relating to procedural issues. 

The EU’s objectives and approach 

The EU aims to establish an appellate mechanism in TTIP so as to allow for review of ISDS rulings. It will help ensure consistency in the interpretation of TTIP and provide both the government and the investor with the opportunity to appeal against awards and to correct errors. This legal review is an additional check on the work of the arbitrators who have examined the case in the first place.

In agreements under negotiation by the EU, the possibility of creating an appellate mechanism in the future is envisaged. However, in TTIP the EU intends to go further and create a bilateral appellate mechanism immediately through the agreement.

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Question 12. Taking into account the above explanation and the text provided in annex as a reference, please provide your views on the creation of an appellate mechanism in TTIP as a means to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement.

J'ai déja indiqué que l'abandon des voies de recours constitue l'abandon d'un droit protégé. Si l'accord doit créer toute une procédure y compris d'appel et de casssation, pourquoi ne pas laisser le RDIE entre les mains des juridictions nationales ? Envisager la création d’un mécanisme d’appel dans le futur est inacceptable. Il doit d’emblée faire partie intégrante de l’accord. Aucun système judiciaire au monde ne prévoit des sanctions sans appel. Une telle possibilité serait un déni de droit et une régression au Moyen-Âge.

C. General assessment

General assessment
  • What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of protection and ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US?
  • Do you see other ways for the EU to improve the investment system?
  • Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the questionnaire that you would like to address?

Appréciation générale très négative : ces clauses d’arbitrage sont dangereuses pour les États et pour leur citoyens ; à la fois sur le plan financier et sur le plan de la souveraineté démocratique. En outre, elles dévalorisent a priori les droits européen et nationaux et les institutions judiciaires chargées de les faire appliquer. Elles donnent en dernière analyse plus de droits aux entreprises étrangères qu’aux citoyens nationaux. Le projet d’accord avec le Canada a fait l’objet d’un Sustainability Impact assessment. Sa conclusion est que l’introduction d’un mécanisme RDIE entre l’UE et le Canada est, au mieux, inutile. Il écrit aussi, page 17, que ce mécanisme « pourrait plutôt servir à rendre le niveau actuel de libéralisation légalement contraignant », et précise, page 207, que ce blocage serait particulièrement net dans le secteur des services financiers. Il suggère, page 20, que la mise en place d’un « mécanisme de règlement des différends d’État à État pourrait être plus appropriée », comme c’est du reste déjà le cas dans le cadre de l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce. Il propose donc, page 22, de supprimer ce mécanisme des arbitrages investisseurs contre États. Il ajoute, page 338, que la crainte des coûts à supporter par les États peut les dissuader de réglementer, et parle de réduction de « l’espace politique » des gouvernements dans les domaines social, économique et environnemental, comme l’ont montré des précédent de gel réglementaire dans d’autres mécanismes ISDS. Il en va de même avec les États-Unis, et pour les mêmes raisons. Par ailleurs, la présente consultation semble faite uniquement pour la forme, puisque la Commission a déclaré récemment que, quel que soit le résultat de la consultation, comme le RDIE était dans son mandat de négociation, il n’était pas question d’y renoncer. Quelle est donc son utilité ? S’agit-il d’une consultation pour faire semblant ? La Commission, qui prétend mieux savoir que les peuples européens ce qui est bon pour eux, a-t-elle oublié que le précédent projet d’Accord Multilatéral sur l’Investissement a finalement été rejeté justement parce qu’il contenait des mécanismes d’arbitrage investisseurs contre États ? Il est du reste très problématique que la Commission ait commandé un impact assessment sur CETA et ait ensuite décidé de n’en tenir aucun compte. En ira-t-il de même avec la présente consultation ? Extraits : « Page 17 : … the overall impact from the CETA may be limited, and instead serve to make the existing level of liberalisation legally binding. Pages 19-20 : Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits of such a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is no solid evidence to suggest that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply serving as one form of an enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also an enforcement mechanism. And the policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, while less significant than foreseen by some parties, would be enough to cast doubt on its contribution to net sustainability benefits. As such, the study’s assessment suggests that a well-crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement mechanism in CETA than ISDS. Page 20 : POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: Page 22 : Investment - Consider excluding ISDS from CETA and instead use a state-state enforcement mechanism like that in the US-Australia FTA. - Consider a number of key issues when drafting dispute settlement expropriation language. - Emphasise domestic dispute settlement even if ISDS is included in CETA. - Exclude ‘essential and basic’ public services from investment commitments. - A dispute settlement monitoring body/forum should be created. Page 207 : Where the CETA is likely to impact the financial services sector is through its ability to legally bind the existing levels of liberalisation, ensuring their future continuation… Page 337 : Regarding ISDS specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits of such a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall (economic, social and environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is no solid evidence to suggest that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply serving as one form of an enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also an enforcement mechanism. And the policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, while less significant than foreseen by some parties, would be enough to cast doubt on its contribution to net sustainability benefits. As such, the study’s assessment suggests that a well-crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement mechanism in CETA than ISDS. Page 338 : … ISDS does usually create at least some minimal economic costs to government. … the state legally maintains the right to regulate in the face of an ISDS mechanism, although it may have to pay compensation in ISDS cases and feel dissuaded from regulating for fear of ISDS cases; and it is important to stress that a reduction in “policy space” as used in this assessment exclusively refers to the ability of governments to make policies that have clear social [as well as economic and environmental] benefits.) … the questionable utility of using ISDS as currently operating rather than domestic courts in Canada and the EU; precedent of ISDS creating some regulatory chill; risk of unrecorded regulatory chill from ISDS; lack of information on ISDS case rulings; and risk created by a ‘third country incorporation’ provision in ISDS in CETA. »